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Introduction 
 
As Jeremy Waldron has noted,1 the recent debate over cosmopolitanism might be 
seen as a continuation of the ‘liberalism versus communitarianism’ debate,2 where 
the main target for communitarian thinkers was John Rawls and his notion of the 
‘unencumbered self.’3 The terms of the debate have simply moved on to include a 
‘global’ reference, that is all. In consequence the old debate has been transformed 
into the ‘cosmopolitanism versus communitarianism,’4 or perhaps the 
‘cosmopolitanism versus patriotism’ debate.5 In what follows I shall examine the 
political thought of Aristotle and of Cicero (who is often considered to be an 
authoritative source for our understanding of the Stoic political thought) in the light 
of this debate, focusing on the issue of personal or political identity (I shall assume 
these are the sane thing). 
 It is usually suggested by contributors to this debate that at the very heart of 
cosmopolitan political thought is the assumption that the basic ‘units’ of 
consideration are individual human beings or ‘person.’6 Consider, for example, 
Thomas Pogge’s account of cosmopolitanism, which has been quite influential and 
has been cited favourably by other commentators.7 According to Pogge, ‘three 
elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, individualism: the ultimate 
units of concern are human beings, or persons – rather than, say, family lines, 
tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations or states. Second, 
universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human 
being equally, not merely to some sub-set, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, 
whites, Muslims. Third, generality: this special status has global force. Persons are 
ultimate units of concern for everyone - not only for their compatriots, fellow 
religionists, or such like.’8 However, although this literature almost invariably 
focuses on the notion of a moral agent understood as a ‘‘person,’ with the exception 
of the work of Martha Nussbaum, there is very little discussion of the issue of what 
actually constitutes such a person, presumably because it is thought that the 
answer to this question is obvious, as all human beings are persons, and all persons 
are human beings. Conspicuous by its absence, then, is any detailed account of 
what, exactly, it is to be a moral ‘person,’ or even a ‘human being.’ What do we 
mean when we talk about ‘persons’ as being the fundamental unit of concern for 
cosmopolitan thinkers. What, in short, is a ‘person’? One of the things I do in what 
follows is consider how Aristotle and Cicero answer this question. 
 It is possible to view the relationship between Aristotle and the Stoics as a 
straightforward opposition between two extremes, the communitarianism of 
Aristotle on the one hand and the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics on the other. It 
might be suggested that the idea that individual moral agents are abstract ‘persons’ 
or ‘human beings’ is entirely absent from the thinking of Aristotle, which is firmly 
rooted in the soil of the ancient Greek polis, its customs and its traditions, and 
whose only identity is that which they possess because they are citizens of a 
particular polis. Similarly, it might be suggested that it is in the philosophy of the 
Stoics, as represented by Cicero, that we find for the first time that abstract notion 
of a ‘person’ who is also a ‘human being,’ and who is in consequence the equal of all 
other human beings, which lies at the heart of all cosmopolitan thinking. In Stoic 
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thought then, allegedly, no importance at all is attached to any duties which might 
be associated with a moral agent’s determinate social identity, his (sic) identity as a 
member of a particular society at a particular time. Indeed, on some accounts one 
has the impression that Cicero and the Stoics do not think that individual moral 
agents actually have any determinate social identity at all, and that they exist in the 
world only as ghostly, shadowy, bloodless, abstract ‘persons.’ 
 If we characterize the relationship between Aristotle and the Stoics in this 
sharply contrasted away then it is evident that some monumentally important 
transformation must have occurred between the time of the death of Aristotle and 
that of the Stoics, or at least that of later, Roman Stoicism, as it is to be found in 
the writings of Cicero (not himself a Stoic), Epictetus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius. 
The difference between the two ways of thinking constitutes an intellectual 
revolution similar to the ‘scientific revolutions’ which have been so famously 
discussed by the philosopher of science, T. S. Kuhn – something akin to a Kuhnian 
‘paradigm shift’ or ‘gestalt switch.’9 There would appear to be no lines of continuity 
at all between these two different philosophical outlooks, no evidence of an 
evolution, as opposed to a revolutionary transformation, from the one way of 
thinking to the other. Hence no possibility of writing any thing like a conventional 
history of ideas, as opposed to what Michel Foucault has famously described as an 
‘archaeology’ of knowledge.10
 In what follows I shall argue against this view. I shall discuss the ideas of both 
Aristotle and of Cicero in turn. In each case I will attempt to show that the 
suggested chasm which exists between them is not as great as it is often thought to 
be. In the case of Aristotle, I shall attempt to demonstrate that, just as in the case 
of moral principles it can be shown that Aristotle does possess some notion of 
‘abstract justice’ or of ‘natural justice,’ and is therefore in some sense a moral 
‘universalist’ and not a ‘relativist,’11 so also in the case of political identity it can be 
shown that Aristotle does possess an abstract understanding of what it is to be a 
moral ‘person’ or ‘agent,’ or a ‘human being.’ Similarly, in the case of Cicero, I shall 
attempt to show that the understanding of moral ‘personality’ which is usually 
associated with Stoicism is inaccurate and requires qualification. This is so because 
in Cicero’s view individual moral agents are not just abstract ‘persons’ but also 
members of a particular society with a determinate social identity and with moral 
duties which are associated with that identity. In short, so far as the issue of 
political identity is concerned, Aristotle is less of a communitarian and more of a 
cosmopolitan thinker than he is often made out to be. And similarly Cicero is more 
of a communitarian and less of a cosmopolitan thinker than he is usually made out 
to be. 
 This does not mean that Aristotle and Cicero could not or should not be 
thought of as being ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers at all. It does, however, suggest that we 
need to think carefully and explain clearly what we mean when we suggest that 
they are. In the case of some commentators this would involve revising one’s 
understanding of the nature of ‘cosmopolitanism.’ For it requires a way of thinking 
about cosmopolitanism which attaches due importance to things which are not 
usually associated with cosmopolitanism, namely, that which is customary or 
conventional, historical or traditional, local and particular. In short it requires us to 
make a distinction between two different kinds of cosmopolitanism one of which 
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might be said to be ‘strong’ or ‘extreme’ and the other of which might be said to be 
‘weak’ or ‘moderate.’12
 
 
Abstract Personality in the Political Thought of Aristotle:  
Is Aristotle a Communitarian? 
 
According to Aristotle the system of corrective justice of a polis treats those with 
which it deals as ‘equals.’ This raises the question of what, for Aristotle, provides 
the basis for this presumption of equality? There is an interesting debate about this 
issue between Ernest J. Weinrib and Steven H. Heyman.13 Weinrib addresses this 
issue in his discussion of Aristotle’s views on corrective justice. Weinrib points out 
that at the heart of Aristotle’s exposition is ‘Aristotle’s assertion that “the law treats 
them as equals”?’ Aristotle’s analysis ‘presupposes the equality of the two parties to 
a transaction.’ There is however, Weinrib claims, a ‘troubling lacuna in Aristotle’s 
explication of corrective justice.’ For what Aristotle does not do is consider explicitly 
the question: ‘In what respect are the parties equal?’14 Weinrib observes that the 
‘parties’ in question ‘cannot rightly be treated as equals unless they are equal in 
some relevant respect.’ So what exactly is it, according to Aristotle, that puts them 
‘on an equal footing?’ Weinrib claims that because Aristotle does not address this 
issue directly and explicitly, he is in consequence unable to ‘help us unravel the 
mystery that his account of corrective justice presents.’15 In Weinrib’s opinion, this 
omission is ‘crucial, even if understandable.’ It is crucial because ‘corrective justice 
remains opaque to the extent that the equality that lies at its heart is unexplained.’ 
On the other hand, it is understandable because this issue ‘has become the object 
of serious reflection only in the last few centuries.’16 It is, indeed, Weinrib 
maintains, addressed explicitly and self-consciously for the first time only in the 
eighteenth century, in the legal philosophies first of Kant then of Hegel. 
 Weinrib tells his readers that one of the main purposes of his discussion of 
Aristotle’s views on corrective justice is to fill this lacuna in Aristotle’s account by 
‘connecting corrective justice to the legal philosophies of Kant and Hegel.’ In his 
view, the assumed equality which lies at the heart of Aristotle’s theory of corrective 
justice is in fact ‘the abstract equality of free purposive beings under the Kantian 
and Hegelian concepts of right.’17 Thus, Aristotle’s account of corrective justice 
‘coalesces with the great modern philosophies of natural right in a single approach 
to the understanding of private law.’18 At first sight, when Weinrib suggests that the 
views of Kant and Hegel might supplement or ‘fill the lacuna’ in Aristotle’s account 
of corrective justice, it is not clear whether he thinks that this is a matter of adding 
something completely new to Aristotle’s analysis, which was not already there; or, 
alternatively, that it is a matter of drawing out and stating explicitly what is already 
there in Aristotle, albeit only implicitly. The ambiguity of his position is clearly 
evident in his claim that ‘the Kantian and Hegelian versions of natural right dovetail 
with Aristotle’s description of corrective justice.’19 A careful reading of Weinrib’s 
article, however, supports the latter rather than the former reading of his position. 
He says, for example, that ‘the differences between the Kantian-Hegelian and the 
Aristotelian accounts of private law are expository, not substantive.’20 And he also 
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maintains that this ‘convergence of corrective justice and natural right bridges the 
oft asserted chasm, between ancient and modern conceptions of law.’21 For 
Aristotle’s theory of corrective justice in so far as it is ‘concerned with the sheer 
correlativity of doing and suffering’ presupposes ‘a conception of the person’ which 
is identical with that of Kant. It might, in consequence, be said to be ‘inchoately 
Kantian.’22  
 Aristotle’s ethical thought is widely thought to be based on the assumption of a 
natural inequality which exists between human beings, whereas, on Weinrib’s 
reading, his doctrine of corrective justice assumes, to the contrary, the natural 
equality of human beings as abstract ‘moral persons’ in the sense in which Kant and 
Hegel understand that expression. This conclusion is somewhat surprising. Indeed, 
most commentators would consider any attribution to Aristotle of a belief in the 
natural equality of all human beings insofar as they are moral agents or ‘persons’ to 
be an historical anachronism. They would, therefore, almost certainly argue that 
something has gone wrong with Weinrib’s analysis somewhere. This is the view of 
Steven Heyman, who disagrees with Weinrib and argues that for Aristotle what 
makes the two ‘parties’ affected by corrective justice and the laws associated with it 
‘equals’ is not the fact that they are abstract moral ‘persons’ but simply the fact that 
they are both members of the same polis – although, strangely, Heyman does not 
employ the term ‘citizen’ in his account of Aristotle’s views. According to Heyman, 
juridical equality for Aristotle is based on the notion of ‘free status.’ Aristotle is of 
the opinion that ‘all free men are arithmetically equal’ specifically ‘with respect to 
that status.’ In Heyman’s account, Aristotle maintains that ‘to injure another 
violates his freedom and disturbs the equality between injurer and victim, giving 
rise to an unjust gain and loss.’ Heyman maintains that for Aristotle the role of 
corrective justice is ‘to annul this injustice and thereby restore equality.’23
 Heyman insists that Aristotle’s view of freedom is, therefore, ‘fundamentally 
different’ from that of Kant. This is so because for Kant ‘freedom is rooted in the 
ability of the individual will to abstract from all particular content, and thereby to 
attain the capacity for free self-determination,’ whereas for Aristotle this is 
(allegedly) not the case. Heyman also maintains that the ‘abstract conception of the 
equality’ of such ‘autonomous individuals’ which is usually associated with this way 
of thinking about freedom is also not to be found in the writings of Aristotle.  This 
idea of the equality of all moral agents as ‘persons’ does indeed lie at the heart of 
the legal philosophies of Kant and Hegel, especially their views on ‘private or 
abstract right.’ Again however, Heyman maintains, for Aristotle this is not the 
case.24 According to Heyman, then, the views of Aristotle differ fundamentally from 
those of both Kant and Hegel because although in his view ‘corrective justice’ does 
consider the ‘parties’ with which it deals as ‘equals,’ nevertheless the equals in 
question are not considered to be equals because they are moral ‘persons,’ or in 
virtue of the fact that they are human beings, but again simply because they 
happen to be ‘citizens’ of the same polis. Heyman would therefore, presumably, 
reject Weinrib’s claim, cited above, that the convergence of corrective justice in 
Aristotle and natural right in Kant and Hegel is something which bridges the ‘chasm’  
which is usually thought to exist between the ‘ancient and modern conceptions of 
law.’ 
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 Now there is a sense in which Heyman is obviously correct here. For nowhere 
does Aristotle discuss explicitly the question of what characteristic feature it is, 
exactly, the possession of which makes the citizens of a polis ‘equals’ and thereby 
justifies the granting of citizenship to them. Nor, consequently, does Aristotle ever 
state explicitly that the characteristic feature in question is the fact that all citizens 
are moral ‘persons.’ He simply asserts that as citizens they are equals, and the laws 
of the polis of which they are members ought, therefore, to treat them equally. 
Nevertheless, it is entirely legitimate for us to consider what assumptions Aristotle 
makes implicitly about the grounds upon which the attribution of citizenship is 
based. What are the qualities which Aristotle assumes can be found in all of the 
citizens of a polis, the possession of which both justifies their being citizens and 
differentiates them from those who are (justifiably) not citizens?  
 Weinrib makes no reference to Aristotle’s views on slavery when considering 
Aristotle’s  views regarding the basis of the distinction between citizens and non-
citizens in ancient Greece. This is surprising, not only because in fourth century 
Athens slaves were an important category of ‘non-citizen,’ but also because Aristotle 
provides us with an extensive discussion of his own views about slavery in the 
Politics. It is fruitful, therefore, to consider Weinrib’s thesis in the light of Aristotle’s 
views on slavery. If we can establish what, in Aristotle’s opinion, are the qualities 
which slaves possess, in virtue of which they are indeed slaves and not citizens or 
‘free men,’ then we will have established what Aristotle considers to be the basis for 
possession of citizenship, and hence also for that equality which, according to 
Aristotle, exists between the citizens of a polis for the purposes of corrective justice.  
 In Book I of the Politics Aristotle makes an important distinction between those 
who in his opinion are slaves by ‘nature’ and those who are slaves ‘legally’ or by 
‘convention.’25 Before proceeding it is necessary to clarify this distinction. 
Presumably for Aristotle these two categories overlap with one another. In other 
words, for Aristotle there are some natural slaves who have not been legally 
enslaved. Similarly, there are some legal slaves who are not natural slaves. Finally, 
there are some legal slaves who are also natural slaves. This third category can be 
sub-divided into those legal slaves who are also natural slaves and who have been 
enslaved precisely because they are natural slaves, on the one hand, and those 
legal slaves who are also natural slaves, but who have not been legally enslaved for 
that reason, on the other. In what follows I shall use the expression ‘natural slave’ 
to refer to those legal slaves who in Aristotle’s opinion are also natural slaves, and 
who have been enslaved for that very reason. 
 Given the account which Weinrib offers of Aristotle’s views on corrective 
justice, it seems likely that he would take the view that Aristotle assumes implicitly 
that what differentiates citizens from natural slaves is precisely the fact that citizens 
are moral persons or human beings; that it is for this very reason that Aristotle 
considers them to be ‘equals’ in relation to one another; and that it is also for this 
reason that Aristotle maintains that they are rightly considered to be equals by the 
laws of their polis. Aristotle’s natural slaves, on the other hand, allegedly lack the 
qualities associated with moral personality and with ‘humanity,’ and are 
consequently not considered to be the ‘equals’ of those citizens who are their 
masters. It is for this reason that, in their case, slavery could not be said to be 
unjust. At least, it seems to me that such a view would be entirely consistent with 
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the broad thrust of Weinrib’s analysis of Aristotle’s views on corrective justice. The 
question arises, therefore, of whether this is a plausible account of Aristotle’s 
justification of natural slavery? If it is, then there is something to be said for 
Weinrib’s thesis, despite the criticisms which Heyman makes of it. If it is not, then 
Weinrib’s claim that Aristotle’s theory of corrective justice relies on the assumption 
that all of the parties concerned are ‘equals’ because they are ‘moral persons’ must 
be rejected. 
 We may begin by noting that at the beginning of the Politics Aristotle does 
present a view of human nature according to which the ‘essence’ of what it is to be 
a human being is a capacity for ‘ethical life,’ or a life of justice. This is what Aristotle 
has in mind when he says that ‘man’ is a ‘social and political animal’ destined to live 
together with others under the laws associated with a particular political community 
or polis.26 Bearing this in mind, we may now consider whether or not Aristotle 
considered the people whom he refers to as ‘natural slaves’ in the Politics to be 
‘human beings’ as he understands that expression. With respect to this issue 
Aristotle’s opinions are inconsistent. Aristotle expresses different views in different 
texts, and sometimes even within the same text. It is true that there are occasions 
when Aristotle takes the view that those whom he considers to be ‘natural slaves’ 
are definitely also human beings. Consequently, provided Aristotle is consistent, the 
justification for their condition of slavery is not, and could not be, the fact that they 
differ from citizens in this particular respect. Thus, for example, at one point in the 
Politics Aristotle asserts that ‘some human beings are by nature free, and others 
slaves.’27 And elsewhere in the Politics he suggests that since even natural slaves 
‘are human beings’ and therefore, as such, ‘share in rational principle,’ it ‘seems 
absurd to say that they have no virtue.’28 Aristotle also expresses similar views in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, although it is unclear from the context whether his 
remarks are intended to apply to those whom he considered to be ‘natural slaves,’ 
to ‘conventional slaves,’ or to both. There, in the course of a general discussion of 
the nature of ‘friendship,’ Aristotle considers the question of whether a master 
might possibly be friends with one of his slaves. Typically, Aristotle equivocates 
when answering this question. As Aristotle himself puts it: ‘Qua slave then, one 
cannot be friends with him.’ However, ‘qua human being one can.’ For, Aristotle 
goes on, ‘there seems to be some justice between any human being and any other’ 
provided they can ‘share in a system of law.’ Therefore, Aristotle concludes, 
because there can be justice between master and slave, ‘there can also be 
friendship’ with a slave, at least ‘in so far as he is a human being.’29
 If we interpret Aristotle in this way, as holding the view that what 
differentiates citizens from those non-citizens who are natural slaves is not the fact 
that the former are ‘human beings,’ and therefore moral ‘persons,’ whereas the 
latter lack this quality, then this evidently counts against Weinrib’s thesis that for 
the purposes of Aristotle’s theory of corrective justice what makes those who are 
‘equals’ in the eyes of the law equals as citizens, and what, therefore, differentiates 
them from those who, like natural slaves, are not citizens, is precisely the fact that 
they do possess moral ‘personality.’ For, as we have seen, Aristotle associates the 
notion of ‘humanity’ with that of a capacity for ‘ethical life’ (Weinrib’s ‘moral 
personality’). But on the view we are currently considering Aristotle thinks that both 
citizens and natural slaves are human beings and therefore, as such, possess the 
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same capacity for ethical life. In short they are both equally ‘moral persons,’ in the 
sense in which Weinrib uses this term. It cannot, therefore, be the case that for 
Aristotle what makes the citizens of a polis the citizens that they are, and what 
differentiates them from natural slaves, is the fact that the former possess ‘moral 
personality’ in Weinrib’s sense whereas the latter do not 
 Similarly, one could also argue that not all ‘non-citizens’ in ancient Athens 
were slaves. Some (the metics) were ‘resident aliens,’ or the citizens of other poleis, 
as indeed was Aristotle himself. Presumably, Aristotle would have conceded that 
they shared in the possession of the qualities associated with ‘moral personality’ to 
exactly the same extent as Athenian citizens, and yet, even so, they were not 
treated by Athenian law as the ‘equals’ of Athenian citizens. It is implausible 
therefore to suggest that, in their case, Aristotle would have wished wish to argue 
that the reason why they were not Athenian citizens is because, like ‘natural slaves,’ 
they lacked the qualities associated with moral personality. But, turning the 
argument around, this line of reasoning also suggests, therefore, that the basis for 
granting citizenship in Aristotle’s thinking is not possession of  ‘moral personality.’ 
At the very least it indicates that Aristotle saw this as only a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition, for the attribution of citizenship. 
 On the other hand, though, things are not quite so clear cut as this. For there 
are at least some passages in Aristotle’s writings which do support Weinrib’s thesis. 
There is some evidence which indicates that in Aristotle’s opinion what makes those 
non-citizens who are natural slaves the slaves that they are, and what justifies their 
being also legal slaves, is precisely the fact that they lack ‘moral personality,’ or the 
capacity for ‘ethical life,’ as Aristotle understands it, and hence that they are not 
really ‘human beings’ at all in the strict sense of the term. And this does suggest, 
again turning the argument around, that Aristotle thinks that what makes free men 
the citizens that they are is precisely the fact that, unlike natural slaves, they do 
possess and exercise a capacity for ethical life, and hence also that they do possess 
what Weinrib refers to as moral ‘personality.’  
 For example, at one point in the Politics Aristotle tells his readers that ‘a state 
exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only.’ For ‘if life only 
were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they cannot, for 
they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice’30 Here Aristotle makes it 
very clear that he thinks that there is no significant difference between a natural 
slave and a ‘brute animal.’ For what is lacking in both, in his opinion, is the 
peculiarly human capacity for ‘free choice.’ The natural slave, Aristotle insists at one 
point, ‘has no deliberative faculty at all.’31 Elsewhere he says that ‘he who 
participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a 
principle, is a slave by nature.’32 In this respect there is a striking similarity between 
those who are natural slaves and what Aristotle refers to as the ‘lower animals.’ For 
‘the lower animals cannot even apprehend a principle,’ but simply ‘obey their 
instincts.’33 It seems clear, however, Aristotle continues, that ‘the use made of 
slaves and of tame animals is not very different.’34 For ‘both with their bodies 
minister to the needs of life.’35 Elsewhere Aristotle refers in both the Politics and the 
Nicomachean Ethics to the idea that slaves are merely ‘living tools or instruments, 
who purpose is to be used, instrumentally, by their masters.36 Instruments 
generally, Aristotle notes in the Politics, ‘are of various sorts. Some are living, 
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others lifeless.’37 A ‘possession,’ Aristotle continues, is ‘an instrument for 
maintaining life,’ and a slave is nothing more than ‘a living possession.’38 Similarly, 
Aristotle tells us in the Nicomachean Ethics that a slave ‘is a living tool and the tool 
a lifeless slave.’39 Consequently, for Aristotle, both natural slaves and animals are 
equally incapable of living that ‘good life,’ that is to say the ethical life, which 
Aristotle thinks is the life appropriate for (fully developed) human beings. Thus for 
Aristotle, on this second reading, there is no significant difference between 
inanimate objects, ‘brute’ animals, and natural slaves. None of these possess the 
characteristic features required for moral ‘personality’ or agency. None of these is 
‘human.’ Consequently, none of them meets one of the necessary conditions for 
being accorded the status of citizenship within a polis. They are all, potentially or 
actually, items of property or ‘instruments’ whose function is to serve the interests 
of human beings, that is to say their owners or masters, whose main concern is to 
live a ‘good life.’ 
 It is clear from this that there are three characteristic features which Aristotle 
associates with humanity, or with being a ‘human being’ in the strict sense of the 
term. These are ‘rationality,’ ‘freedom’ or ‘autonomy,’ and the capacity for living a 
‘good life’ or an ‘ethical life.’ All of those who possess these features could be said to 
be ‘human beings’ in the strict sense of the term. Hence they possess those 
features which are at least necessary for being granted citizenship in a polis. 
Moreover, we can be sure that all of those who are the citizens of some polis or 
other can also be said to be ‘human beings,’ precisely because they possess these 
features. For Aristotle then the individuals who are members of the class which 
includes the citizens of all poleis everywhere are the same individuals who are 
members of the class which includes all human beings everywhere. In this respect 
Aristotle’s views are similar to those of the Stoic philosophers who came after him. 
There is, however, an important difference between the two. For in the case of the 
Stoics this idea goes beyond the boundaries of the ancient Greek polis, and is 
associated with the notion a ‘cosmopolis,’ a global city which includes the entire 
human race, whereas for Aristotle it does not. 
  Given that Aristotle thinks that a ‘good life’ is a moral or an ‘ethical life,’ a life 
of justice, it is not too surprising that Aristotle is prepared to take seriously not only 
the question of whether natural slaves are capable of living a life of this kind, but 
also the possibility that they might indeed lack this capacity. As Aristotle puts it, ‘a 
question may indeed be raised, whether there is any excellence at all in a slave 
beyond and higher than merely instrumental and ministerial qualities - whether he 
can have the virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and the like; or whether 
slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities?’40 Aristotle is acutely conscious 
of the relevance of this question for the debate about the justice or injustice of 
slavery, and of the problems which it poses for those like himself who think that 
some individuals are natural slaves and that, at least in their case, slavery could not 
be said to be unjust. ‘Whichever way we answer’ this question, Aristotle notes, ‘a 
difficulty arises.’41  For in the first place if it is allowed that slaves do ‘have virtue,’ 
then ‘in what will they differ from freemen?’42 That is to say, if it is admitted that so 
far as their capacity to live an ethical life is concerned there is no significant 
difference at all between a slave and a free citizen, and that slaves and citizens are 
‘equals’ in this particular regard, then what possible moral justification could there 
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be for slavery? As Aristotle was evidently well aware, such an admission undermines 
completely the claim that there are such things as natural slaves, and (in the 
absence of any alternative argument justifying slavery) would amount to an 
acknowledgement that slavery is indeed unjust, precisely because it involves 
treating unequally those who are in fact by nature equal.  On the other hand, 
though, if it is argued that what differentiates slaves from citizens or ‘free men’ is 
the fact that slaves do indeed lack the capacity for ethical life (Weinrib’s moral 
‘personality’) whereas citizens do not – and hence that slaves are not properly 
speaking ‘human beings’ at all - then this also serves to undermine the institution of 
slavery, albeit for a quite different reason. For such a view, if taken seriously, 
implies that slaves are incapable of performing the moral duties associated with 
their particular station in society. Indeed it implies, as Hegel was later to observe, 
that slaves. Living as they do in some important sense ‘outside of society,’ can have 
neither rights nor duties - something which, not surprisingly, at least in the case of 
the duties associated with slavery, Aristotle is unwilling to accept.43
  A further observation which supports the view that Aristotle does not consider 
natural slaves to be human beings is the following. If Aristotle did indeed think that 
even his ‘natural slaves’ are ‘human beings,’ then he must have also thought that 
not all human beings possess the same capacity for moral personality and hence the 
same moral worth. But what then are the features which those individual human 
beings who do possess those qualities associated with ‘moral personality’ (Aristotle’s 
potential citizens), and those which do not (Aristotle’s natural slaves), have in 
common in virtue of the fact that they all might be said to be ‘human beings’? If 
Aristotle’s natural slaves lack a capacity for ethical life, and yet nevertheless remain 
‘human beings,’ this seems to imply that Aristotle has a ‘lowest common 
denominator’ understanding of human nature, such that the qualities associated 
with it have nothing at all to do with those features in virtue of which human beings 
possess a moral ‘personality,’ that is to say, ‘rationality,’ ‘freedom’ and ‘morality.’ 
But such an interpretation of Aristotle flatly contradicts what Aristotle says at the 
beginning of the Politics about human nature, especially of course his claim that 
human beings are social and political animals whose function is to live an ‘ethical 
life.’ 
 My conclusion is, then, that despite the criticisms which Heyman makes of it, 
there is something to be said for Weinrib’s claim that Aristotle’s theory of corrective 
justice presupposes the assumption on Aristotle’s part that a necessary if not a 
sufficient precondition for possession of citizenship, and hence also for that 
‘equality’ which exists between the citizens of a polis so far as its system of 
corrective justice is concerned, is indeed that ‘moral personality’ or capacity for 
ethical life which all human beings have in common.  
 This is not to say, however, that Heyman’s critique of Weinrib is completely 
wide of the mark. For there are strengths as well as weaknesses in Heyman’s 
interpretation of Aristotle, just as there are in that of Weinrib. It is, indeed, fruitful 
to consider the issue of whether these two approaches might not be in some way 
combined, and, if so, how this might be done. As I have presented it so far, the 
debate between Weinrib and Heyman involves a straightforward ‘either-or’ choice 
between on the one hand thinking, as Weinrib does, of individual moral agents in a 
purely philosophical or ahistorical manner, as ‘abstract moral persons’ in the 
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manner of Kant and (allegedly) Hegel, and on the other hand thinking of them, as 
Heyman does, as historically situated ‘selves’ who possess a determinate social 
identity as the citizens of a particular polis. In short, Aristotle is either considered to 
be an extreme ‘cosmopolitan’ thinker (Weinrib) or an extreme communitarian 
thinker (Heyman). What neither Weinrib nor Heyman consider is the possibility that, 
for Aristotle, an individual moral agent might actually be committed to both ways of 
thinking at the same time. For there is no logical inconsistency in attributing to 
Aristotle the view that an individual moral agent who is a citizen of a particular polis 
and who possesses a particular social identity with attendant moral rights and 
duties, as for example an Athenian, a Corinthian, or a Stagyrite, is also a ‘human 
being’ and therefore a moral ‘person.’ Indeed, it seems clear that the same 
individual might be considered from either one or the other of these two different 
(but not incompatible) points of view depending on the circumstances. 
 We may illustrate this way of thinking about Aristotle’s views on moral agency 
by considering again the passage from the Nicomachean Ethics referred to earlier, 
which runs as follows: 
For where there is nothing common to ruler and ruled, there is not friendship 
either, since there is not justice; e.g. between craftsman and tool, soul and 
body, master and slave; the latter in each case is benefited by that which uses 
it, but there is no friendship nor justice towards lifeless things. But neither is 
there friendship towards a horse or an ox, nor to a slave qua slave. For there is 
nothing common to the two parties; the slave is a living tool and the tool a 
lifeless slave. Qua slave then, one cannot be friends with him. But qua human 
being one can; for there seems to be some justice between any human being 
and any other who can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement; 
therefore there can also be friendship with him in so far as he is a man.44
Although Aristotle does not say so explicitly, it is evident that in this passage he is 
referring to legal or conventional rather than natural slavery. It is also evident that 
he thinks that the slaves to which he is referring are indeed ‘human beings.’ They 
possess a moral personality. They can and do live some kind of ‘ethical life.’ Hence 
they have ‘duties,’ even if they do not have ‘rights.’ In short, at least in this 
passage, for Aristotle being a slave is similar to being a tailor or a cobbler. It 
involves the possession of a determinate social identity like any other. From this 
point of view, the individual who is a slave does not stand completely outside of all 
human society. One of the striking things about this passage is the fact that within 
it Aristotle indicates clearly that he thinks of the individuals who possess the identity 
of masters and slaves as ‘human beings’ as well as masters and slaves. This 
passage suggests that for Aristotle if the individuals who possess the identity of 
being either masters or slaves, nevertheless there is more to them than this fact. 
For they are also ‘human beings’ and can relate morally to one another as such. 
There is a sense in which they can be said to ‘share in a system of law,’ although 
evidently this is not the law of the polis of which the master is a citizen. For unlike 
the master the slave is not a member of that polis and has no rights in law. 
Similarly, the passage also suggests that for Aristotle there is more to human 
beings than the simple fact that they are ‘human beings.’ For individual human 
beings must also possess a determinate social identity. They must also be masters, 
or slaves, tailors or cobblers, Athenians or Corinthians, and so on. In addition to 
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their abstract or universal moral ‘personality’ they must also possess a particular 
identity as members of some polis or other, and the rights and duties associated 
with it.  
 In short, in this passage Aristotle suggests that a ‘person’ or a self is a unified 
entity which is internally differentiated. The psyche of an individual is ‘dual’ or ‘split.’ 
It possesses two component elements or ‘parts.’ One of these is associated with the 
‘universal’ features (rationality, freedom and morality) which individuals possesses 
insofar as they are ‘human beings’, or ‘persons’ in general. The other is associated 
with those features which individuals possess insofar as the have a determinate 
social identity as members of a particular society at a particular time. In the next 
section I shall consider this same idea as it is to be found in the writings of Cicero. 
   
 
Determinate Social Identity in the Political Thought of the Stoics: 
Is Cicero a Cosmopolitan? 
 
So far as the Stoics are concerned, Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse have claimed 
that ‘the term “cosmopolitanism” originates with the Stoics, whose idea of being “a 
citizen of the world” neatly captures the two main aspects of cosmopolitanism: that 
it entails a thesis about identity and that it entails a thesis about responsibility.’45 
The notion of a ‘cosmopolitan identity’ is at first sight a strange one. It suggests 
that an individual could have a determinate social identity as a ‘cosmopolitan.’ 
Against this, however, it might be suggested that to think of individuals human 
beings from a ‘cosmopolitan’ point of view is to think of them ‘abstractly,’ simply as 
‘persons,’ that is to say, as lacking any determinate social identity at all. From this 
point of view ‘cosmopolitanism’ is associated with the absence of any determinate 
social identity rather than the presence of a determinate special identity of a 
particular, ‘cosmopolitan,’ kind. One possible response to this would be to argue 
that to say that an individual is a ‘cosmopolitan’ is to say, not that they lack a 
particular social identity entirely, but that they possess more than one such identity. 
Such an individual is associated with a plurality or multiplicity of identities, the 
assumption being, perhaps, that these have been freely chosen by the individual 
concerned, who has undergone some process of ‘self-identification,’ or ‘identity 
construction.’ Jeremy Waldron has captured this idea very well when he refers to 
‘the cosmopolitan self’ who ‘learns Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothes made in 
Korea, listens to arias by Verdi sung by a Maori princess on Japanese equipment, 
follows Ukrainian politics and practices Buddhist meditation techniques.’46
  Cicero has some interesting things to say about this issue in Book I of his De 
Officiis.47 For example, at one point he says that ‘we are invested by Nature with 
two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our 
being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above 
the brute. From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the 
rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is the one that is 
assigned to individuals in particular.’48 This remark is ambiguous. It is unclear 
whether Cicero thinks that individual human beings are associated with a 
multiplicity of characters or ‘selves,’ or alternatively whether he thinks that they are 
associated with a unified self which is internally differentiated, possessing more than 
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one aspect or parts. Cicero’s employment of the expression ‘as it were’ here 
suggests the latter rather than the former. To keep things simple for the purposes 
of the present discussion, I shall assume in what follows that Cicero does have the 
latter view in mind. 
 Important questions for anyone wishing to understand Cicero’s views on this 
subject include: how are these two selves, or rather parts of the self, supposed to 
be related to one another? Does Cicero think that the relationship which exists 
between them is a contingent one, such that the one self, or part of the self, might 
exist without the other, as Cicero’s reference to a plurality of multiplicity of ‘selves’ 
suggests? Or are they, perhaps, necessarily connected to one another, as the 
language of ‘parts’ or ‘aspects’ of the self appears to suggest? And which (if any) of 
these two selves, or parts of the self, is the more important, in Cicero’s view, for 
those seeking an adequate understanding of an individual’s personal identity? For 
example, could either one of them be said on its own to constitute an individual 
persons’ ‘true’ or ‘essential’ self?  
 We may note at the outset that the answers which Cicero gives to these 
questions, and hence his views regarding the issue of personal identity, are not 
always consistent with one another. In effect, there are two views which run 
throughout his remarks on this issue, which Cicero does not clearly distinguish or 
keep separate from one another. According to the first view, Cicero is of the opinion 
that there is only one personality or self, and this has both ‘universal’ and 
‘particular’ characteristics. However on this view the relationship which exists 
between the universal dimension of the self and its particular dimension is a 
necessary rather than a contingent one. In other words, each of these two ‘parts’ of 
the self is necessary and neither on its own is sufficient for an individual self to be 
the self that it is. From this point of view, if an individual should lose some or all of 
those features which are associated with this ‘particular’ self then that individual 
would, quite literally, be transformed into a different person with a different 
identity. I shall call this Cicero’s ‘Necessity Theory of the Self.’ 
 According to the second view, the two parts of an individual ‘self’ can be 
conceptually separated from one another and considered in isolation. One of these, 
however, is the more important than the other and captures better than the other 
just who an individual person is. This is the universal and not the particular self, and 
it is therefore our true or essential self. This self stands in a contingent relationship 
to the particular self, or to the characteristic features which are associated with an 
individual’s particular identity. In other words an individual could lose some or all of 
these features and yet nevertheless remain exactly the same ‘person’ as they were 
before. Henceforth I shall call this Cicero’s ‘Contingency Theory of the Self.’ 
 It should be noted that according to neither of these theories of the self does 
Cicero think of individual moral agents as being merely abstract ‘persons’ who lack 
entirely any determinate social identity – that is to say a particular self, or a 
particular dimension to their self.49 The difference between these two views is not 
that according to one of them Cicero thinks of a moral agent as being just an 
abstract ‘person,’ whereas on the other view he does not. Rather, the difference 
between these two views has to do with the way in which the relationship which 
exists between what Cicero refers to as the ‘universal’ self and the ‘particular’ self, 
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or between the universal and the particular parts of the self, is conceived – whether 
it is thought of as being either a contingent or as a necessary relationship.  
 So far as the ‘universal’ self is concerned, Cicero associates this with the 
characteristics which we possess because we are human beings, and which he 
assumes all human beings in all societies everywhere have in common. In the 
passage cited earlier Cicero refers explicitly to ‘reason’ and the capacity for 
‘morality,’ or for living an ethical life, which he considers to be a life devoted to 
duty, especially the duties associated with one’s station, position or place as a 
member of a particular society at a particular time. Later he introduces a third 
universal characteristic, namely ‘freedom,’ or the capacity of ‘free choice.’ I will 
begin by discussing the relationship which exists between this ‘universal’ self and 
the ‘particular’ self according to what I have referred to as the ‘Necessity Theory of 
the Self.’ In order to clarify Cicero’s views we need to consider what he has in mind 
when he talks about the ‘particular’ self. 
 One of the features which Cicero associates with the particular self is purely 
physical, and has to do with such features as a person’s stature, colour of hair, and 
bodily appearance in general. Another is what today we would refer to as matters of 
individual ‘psychology, and has to do with things which are associated with an 
individual person’s temperament. As again Cicero puts it: ‘In the matter of physical 
endowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for the race, 
others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal appearance, some have 
stateliness, others comeliness…,’ but, He goes on, ‘diversities of character are 
greater still.’ Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus, for example, ‘had a large fund of 
wit,’ and Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, ‘had a still richer fund and employed it with 
more studied purpose.’50  Before proceeding, it is important to note that Cicero does 
not claim that these individual differences pertaining to a particular person or self, 
or to the self in its particularity, are of no importance – that they should be set 
aside, ignored or criticized rather than valued by moral philosophers. On the 
contrary, he insists that ‘countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and 
characters, and they are not in the least to be criticized.’51 For one cannot ignore 
them if one wishes to know who, in particular, a person is and hence also what their 
duties are. ‘It is each man's duty,’ Cicero maintains, ‘to weigh well what are his own 
peculiar traits of character, to regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how 
another man's would suit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, 
the better it fits him.’52  
 Cicero attaches a great deal of importance to questions of ‘propriety,’ or to the 
issue of how individual moral agents ought to live, where their duties lie and how 
their duties are determined. In this connection there are two other aspects of the 
identity of a particular person which he discusses. These might be said to be 
sociological, rather than physical or psychological. Or perhaps, more accurately, 
given that on this first view of the self they are associated with ‘moral personality,’ 
it should be said that they have to do with matters of social as opposed to individual 
psychology. The first of these has to do with what, today, would be referred to as 
one’s cultural identity. Surprisingly, given that he is widely assumed to be a 
‘cosmopolitan’ thinker, Cicero is well aware of and sensitive to the importance of 
cultural differences as determinants of moral conduct. He maintains that one has 
different moral duties from others because one is either a Greek or Roman, just as 
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one has different moral duties from others because one is either a soldier or a 
senator.  
 According to Cicero moral ‘propriety’ is associated with ‘uniform consistency in 
the course of our life as a whole and in all its individual actions.’ Cicero suggests at 
one point that this is a matter of being true to ourselves and of the peculiarities of 
our own individual character. It is a matter of refraining from ‘copying the personal 
traits of others and eliminating one's own.’ In short, it is a matter of expressing 
oneself and one’s identity as an individual. One example of this is the language 
which one speaks, or chooses to speak if one is in a position to make such a choice. 
With respect to this issue Cicero is adamant that ‘we [Romans] ought to employ our 
mother tongue, lest, like certain people who are continually dragging in Greek 
words, we draw well deserved ridicule upon ourselves.’53
  Also however, and perhaps more importantly, Cicero maintains that those who 
wish to express their own individuality or particular identity must follow the moral 
code, or the customs and conventions, of the society in which they live. Again 
surprisingly, for someone who is supposed to be a cosmopolitan thinker, Cicero 
maintains that just as in the case of the language we speak, so also more generally 
‘we ought not to introduce anything foreign into our actions or our life in general.’ 
He takes care to emphasize the importance which ‘diversity of character’ of this kind 
has for any attempt to understand the ethical life of individual human beings,’ who 
must necessarily be members of some particular society or other, and therefore 
possess a determinate social identity. He says that this is so important, or ‘carries 
with it so great significance’ that an action such as, for example, the act of suicide 
‘may be for one man a duty,’ whereas ‘for another,’ under the same circumstances, 
it may be ‘a crime.’54 For Cicero, on this view, whether one should consider suicide 
to be a duty or a crime depends, therefore, on who one is and where one lives or 
comes from, that is to say, one’s particular personal identity, or one’s identity as a 
particular person. For the features associated with one’s particular self are a 
necessary aspect or part of who one is, and therefore an important determinant of 
one’s duties to others.  
 We saw above that although at times his analysis of the component elements 
of a particular self is a relatively sophisticated one (for example, in the passages 
from the De Officiis under discussion Cicero suggests that human beings possess 
not one, or two but four ‘selves’), nevertheless Cicero also concedes that there is 
something to be said for a much simpler account which suggests that the self is a 
unified entity which possesses just two component parts, one of which is ‘universal’ 
and the other ‘particular,’ and neither of which is separable from the other. This has 
been noted by Derek Heater, who observes that for the Stoics it is not the case that 
an individual has two ‘selves,’ a universal self and a particular self. It would, rather, 
be more accurate to speak in terms of a unitary self which is at the same time a 
‘divided self.’55 The Stoics, Heater maintains, ‘taught of the oneness of the universe 
and of man’s dual identity as a member of his state and of humanity.’56 Each of 
these aspects of the identity of an individual person is associated with a certain 
framework of moral duties or obligations; either the universally valid ones which are 
owed to all other human beings or persons who are also members or citizens of the 
‘cosmopolis’ which is the universe; or, alternatively, the particular duties and 
obligations which we owe to others with whom we are connected in our own society.  
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 As Heater notes, there is in consequence a connection in Stoic thinking 
between the idea of an individual having a ‘split’ identity, one the one hand, and 
that of the individual being a member, of two quite different societies or moral 
communities, two ‘republics’ on the other.57 Heater insists that Stoic 
cosmopolitanism did not, therefore, ‘preclude the holding of other identities (sic) 
simultaneously with world citizenship.’58 In his view the Stoics, or at least the 
Roman Stoics, did not by any means ‘discard their citizenship identities and duties 
in favour of their commitment to world citizenship.’ Rather, they ‘felt the conscious 
need to accommodate the two identities (sic),’ or ‘roles,’ ‘simultaneously and 
comfortably.’59 It is clear, however, that at least in principle, and perhaps also 
therefore in practice, this accommodation might in some situations prove difficult. 
For Cicero’s analysis of the self does raise the possibility that a conflict of duties 
might occur. It also raises the problem of establishing which set of duties, those of 
the cosmopolis on the one hand or of one’s own  community on the other, should 
take precedence should such a conflict arise. Heater has suggested that such a 
conflict between the two opposed positions of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and 
‘communitarianism’ might be seen as an attempt by ‘both sides’ to claim ‘total 
control of the individual’s political identity.60  
 I said above that Cicero discusses two aspects of the particular self which have 
to do, neither with the physical characteristics of a person nor with matters of 
individual psychology. These aspects have to do with an individual’s moral 
personality insofar as it is related to one’s social identity. The first of these aspects, 
as we have seen, has to do with an individual’s cultural inheritance. The second 
feature has to do with the issue of employment, one’s career, or with one’s station 
or position in the social hierarchy of the society of which one happens to be a 
member. For according to Cicero this, too, is one of the important factors which 
together determine just who one is, and where in particular one’s moral duties lie. 
In his view, as well as being ‘human beings,’ we are all members of a particular 
society at a particular time, and as such it is necessary that we have a particular 
occupation or career and that we carry out the duties associated with it (provided 
these do not conflict with the requirements of natural law or our duties, as human 
beings, to other human beings). Social identity in this sense is, therefore, an 
important determinant of those duties which individuals need to perform if they are 
to live ethical lives. In short, there are times when Cicero suggests that whether 
one is a soldier or a senator, for example, is just as much an important determinant 
of one’s particular social identity as the fact that one is either Greek or Roman, and 
that one’s career or occupation is just as much a part of the identity of an individual 
as the fact that s/he is a human being, or a person. In short, Cicero sometimes says 
things which imply that in his view an individual’s occupation is a necessary rather 
than a contingent part of who they are. As such it cannot be relinquished without 
also changing that individuals’ identity. An individual who made such a change 
would, from this point of view, quite literally become a different person.  
 What then, in Cicero’s view, ought to be the attitude of individuals towards the 
particular social identities which they possess? Generally speaking, it is Cicero’s 
opinion that we should ‘work to the best advantage in that rôle to which we are best 
adapted.’61 However, he says, should it transpire that ‘circumstances shall thrust us 
aside into some uncongenial part,’ we must nonetheless ‘devote to it all possible 
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thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform it, if not with 
propriety, at least with as little impropriety as possible.’62 In short, even if we feel 
unhappy and unfulfilled in our work, we cannot change that, as this is an essential 
part of who we are and of where our duties lie. The only course that is available to 
us, therefore, is to conscientiously carry out the duties which are associated with it 
even if this should make us ‘unhappy.’ 
 But this not all that Cicero says about the issue of occupation or employment 
and its relationship to one’s determinate social identity or one’s particular self. For 
there are also times when Cicero suggests that in his view the relationship which 
one has to one’s occupation, or to this aspect of one’s particular identity, is not a 
necessary at all but a contingent one. I now turn, therefore, to consider what I have 
called the ‘Contingency Theory of the Self,’ a theory which can also to be found in 
Cicero’s De Officiis alongside the ‘Necessity Theory’ just discussed. At one point, for 
example, Cicero maintains that so far as our occupation or career is concerned we 
have a duty to ourselves, which is to ‘follow the bent of our own particular nature.’ 
We must, he says, ‘resolutely hold fast’ to our ‘own peculiar gifts,’63  in order that 
we might express ourselves in and through our chosen career. For again this is a 
fundamentally important determinant of our social identity – of who we are, and 
therefore of where our duties lie.64  
 Cicero notes, however, that this aspect of one’s personal identity, of who in 
particular one is, is to some considerable degree a matter of luck or chance. ‘Regal 
powers and military commands, nobility of birth and political office, wealth and 
influence, and their opposites,’ he says, often ‘depend upon chance’ rather than 
upon us, and are, therefore, in large degree ‘controlled by circumstances.’ But 
although this is true some of the time, it is not always or entirely true. We can, 
Cicero suggests, at least some of us,  and/or at least some of the time, also 
influence the course of events in this regard. Cicero therefore acknowledges that to 
a certain degree at least, our social identity is something ‘which we assume by our 
own deliberate choice.’65 As Cicero himself puts it, ‘what rôle we ourselves may 
choose to sustain’ in society is sometimes ‘decided by our own free choice.’ Thus, he 
observes, ‘some turn to philosophy, others to the civil law, and still others to 
oratory.’66  
 In Cicero’s view it is important that those who are able to make this choice 
should ‘get it right,’ as this will make it much easier for them to carry out the duties 
associated with their future station in life. For, as we have seen, there is reason to 
suppose that in choosing one’s career one is also to some considerable extent 
choosing oneself – at least one’s particular self. One is, Cicero observes, not simply 
choosing to perform a particular action on  particular occasion, but, by choosing one 
career rather than another, one is in effect ‘ordering the whole course of one's 
life.’67 And this ‘is a matter to which still greater care must be given’ than when we 
choose to perform a particular action on just one occasion, in order that ‘we may be 
true to ourselves throughout all our lives and not falter in the discharge of any 
duty.’68 In Cicero’s opinion, then, those who make such a  choice are in effect 
choosing who it is that they wish to be. Whichever choice one makes, the person 
one becomes will have a position in society, a position with attendant duties, and it 
will be much easier, Cicero thinks, to carry out these duties if one considers one 
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social position to be an expression rather than a limitation of one’s own free choice 
– of one’s own self. 
 Cicero recognizes that certain individuals might, for whatever reason, be 
located in social positions or roles which are not in fact well suited to their 
character. Such person will not feel happy or fulfilled and will think that carrying out 
the duties associated with their station in life is burdensome, a limitation of their 
freedom, rather than an opportunity for self-expression. Interestingly, Cicero’s 
recommendation to those who are in such a position is not that they ought to do 
their duty, at no matter what cost to themselves, but rather that, if it is possible for 
them to do so, they should change their career. It is possible, Cicero notes, that 
someone might ‘discover that he has made a mistake in choosing his life work.’ If 
this should happen, Cicero continues, then ‘he must change his vocation and mode 
of life.’ Such a change, and the transformation of one’s particular social identity 
associated with it, might be seen by others as a dereliction of duty, as an outright 
rejection of the call of duty, rather than as the expression of a desire to replace one 
set of duties for another. Consequently, ‘when we have once changed our calling in 
life,’ we must, Cicero insists, ‘take all possible care to make it clear that we have 
done so with good reason.’69 It is clear form this that Cicero associates ‘freedom,’ 
not with the absence of duty but, rather, with a situation in which by choosing a 
career, and hence also a determinate social identity, one has also chosen for oneself 
where one’s duty lies. 
 This aspect of Cicero’s thinking is evidently one of the sources of inspiration for 
the work done by Michel Foucault, towards the end of his life, on a form of ethics 
associated with the idea of the ‘care of the self.’70 This has generated some interest, 
for example, amongst classics scholars, and has indeed led them to focus on the 
issue of the theorization of the ‘self’ which took place in the ancient world.71 A. A. 
Long, for example, has referred positively to the work of Foucault in this regard. 
According to Long, Cicero ‘provides a conceptual framework to enable individuals to 
analyze their own sense of who they are, and what is incumbent on them.’ The 
suggestion is, Long goes on, ‘that self-analysis along these lines will ideally result in 
a disposition to act in a way that both respects general ethical norms and, at the 
same time, fits the person one is.’ Long maintains that this represented an 
innovation in Roman thought, as ‘traditional Roman values had not depended on 
introspective analysis and self-monitoring; a man's peers told him how he was 
doing.’ In this passage from Cicero then, Long maintains, ‘we witness the first 
Roman instance of a concern with the ‘self’ as moral authority.’ Long notes that 
‘Cicero himself does not develop the point.’ However, for later Stoics ‘under the 
Empire,’ such a ‘care of the “self” becomes the primary focus of ethics.’72  
 It is important to appreciate the full implications of the remarks which Cicero 
makes about this issue of ‘choosing one’s self’ for our understanding of his views on 
the self in general. For once they are unpacked it is clear that they imply a quite 
different understanding of the self, and of the relationship which exists between the 
universal self and the particular self, from the ‘Necessity Theory of the Self’ outlined 
earlier. Indeed, they imply that for Cicero, on this reading at any rate, individual 
moral agents just are abstract ‘persons,’ which although they must have some 
‘particular identity’ or other, are not necessarily associated with any particular 
‘particular identity.’  
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 To see why this is so, we may note that a striking feature of Cicero’s discussion 
of personal identity is that, like Epictetus, he endorses an early version of what 
today is referred to as the ‘dramaturgical theory of society,’ which sees human 
society as being similar to a theatre. Cicero suggests that at least in principle 
(though not necessarily in practice) all human beings are free to choose their own 
particular social identity. He says that we are like actors who may or may not 
choose to play a particular part on the stage. Given this, as Cicero himself puts it, 
‘every one, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own natural ability and 
show himself a critical judge of his own merits and defects.’ We should not, he 
continues, ‘let actors display more practical wisdom than we have.’ For actors 
‘select, not the best plays, but the ones best suited to their talents.’ Shall a player, 
Cicero continues,  ‘have regard to this in choosing his rôle upon the stage, and a 
wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in life?’73  
 Cicero’s suggestion that a moral agent or ‘person’ is just like an actor, who can 
freely choose to play any ‘part’ at all and who, presumably, would continue to be 
the same actor irrespective of which part they chose to play, represents a quite 
different way of thinking about a ‘self’ or ‘person’ than that associated with the 
‘Necessity Theory’  discussed earlier. For on this second view the most important, 
indeed the sole, determinant of the personal identity of individual are the universal 
characteristics which they possess in consequence of the fact that they are human 
beings. These and these only are necessary features of an individual self, which 
therefore stands in a contingent relationship with those identifying characteristics, 
such as physical characteristics, psychological temperament, cultural identity and 
occupation, which Cicero associates with the particular self. According to this 
‘Contingency Theory,’ an individual person could lose any or all of these particular 
features (though not all particular features) and yet nevertheless remain the same 
person. 
 Paradoxically, the ‘Contingency Theory of the Self’ may be said to differ from 
the ‘Necessity Theory’ both because it considers the self to be more fragmented 
than the ‘Necessity Theory’ does and because it considers the self to be more 
unitary than the ‘Necessity Theory’ does. It considers the self to be more 
fragmented because, according to the ‘Contingency Theory,’ the two aspects 
associated with ‘dual’ or ‘split’ personality which is central to the ‘Necessity Theory,’ 
that is to say the ‘universal’ and the ‘particular ‘self,’ should be considered as being 
entirely separate from one another. They are not to be thought of as being 
necessarily connected, as parts to a whole. It is more unitary because, despite 
Cicero talking about the existence of two ‘selves’ in this context, rather than two 
different dimensions of the self, according to the ‘Contingency Theory’ such talk is 
not to be taken seriously. The logical outcome of Cicero’s’ employment of the 
dramaturgical analogy is that there are not two ‘selves’ here at all, but only one, 
namely that which Cicero refers to as the ‘universal’ self. It is this which, according 
to the ‘Contingency Theory’ is an individual’s true or essential self, and it is this 
which, in his view, continues to be, no matter what changes take place in the 
particularities of an individual’s life, such as for example a change in that 
individual’s occupation, religion, and so on. Once the logical implications of the basic 
assumptions of the ‘Contingency Theory’ have been worked out, then, it is clear 
that, insofar as Cicero is associated with it, his view of the self is in fact a unitary 
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one. From this point of view, this unitary ‘self’ is seen as being entirely lacking in 
any of the particular characteristics which, according to the ‘Necessity Theory,’ 
make an individual self the individual self that it is. 
 What is most significant for present purposes is that there is a surprising 
tendency in Cicero’s his thinking to emphasize the importance of that which is 
particular, local, customary, traditional and historical, as opposed to that which is 
rational and universal, in the ethical life of human beings. Cicero does recognize 
that the idea of a ‘human being’ or of a moral ‘person’ is an abstraction, and that no 
such things could exist on its own, separately from some collection of particular 
identifying characteristics or other. Human beings always live in particular societies 
at particular times. They always also possess a determinate social or political 
identity. And in Cicero’s view, at least according to the ‘Necessity Theory of the Self’ 
to which he occasionally subscribes, this is just as much a part of their identity as 
moral agents, or of who they are, as the fact that they are human beings and 
members of the Stoic ‘cosmopolis.’ Moreover, the ethical life of all human beings is 
always, in consequence, associated with at least some moral rules which apply only 
to them and their fellows, and not to other human beings who are members of 
different communities with different identities, and so on. Nor generally does Cicero 
think that in practice a conflict between these two personae of any individual human 
being living in a  particular society at a particular times actually occurs. 
 The analysis presented above suggests that, whether he subscribed to the 
‘Contingency Theory of the Self’ or the ‘Necessity Theory of the Self,’ in neither case 
does Cicero think, at least initially, of moral agents as being abstract ‘persons’ who 
might be said to be ‘disembodied,’ in two senses of that term: first in the sense that 
they lack any physical characteristics; and second in the sense that they lack a 
determinate social identity. It therefore undermines the claim that Cicero is a 
certain kind of ‘cosmopolitan’ thinker. It indicates that Cicero does possess an 
awareness of, and respect for, the moral and cultural differences which exist 
between different societies, and the way in which they impact on the moral lives of 
their members. We need, therefore, to significantly qualify the claim that Cicero is a 
cosmopolitan thinker who attaches no moral significance at all either to the 
traditions, customs and conventions of particular societies, or to the particular social 
identities of moral agents.  
 Cicero’s’ understanding of what it is to be a ‘person is a complex (and perhaps 
contradictory) one. It is arguable that this has not been sufficiently appreciated by 
those involved in the recent debate over cosmopolitanism, who tend not to be at all 
interested in this issue. One exception to this is Martha Nussbaum.74 However, 
Nussbaum’s account of the Stoic understanding of the self is marred by the same 
logical inconsistencies as are to be found in the writings of Cicero. To be more 
specific, Nussbaum is unclear whether Cicero and/or the Stoics subscribe to the 
‘Necessity theory of the Self’ or the ‘Contingency Theory of the Self.’75  
 At times Nussbaum acknowledges that the Stoics did not attach exclusive 
importance to global issues, or to that which is universal in the moral life of human 
beings. Thus, for example, she maintains that according to the Stoics ‘each of us 
dwells, in effect, in two communities – the local community of our birth and the 
community of human argument and aspiration.’76 And she concedes that ‘the Stoics 
stress that to be a citizen of the world one does not need to give up local 
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identifications, which can be a source of great richness in life.’77 ‘We need not,’ 
Nussbaum states, ‘give up our special affections and identifications, whether ethnic 
or gender based, or religious. We need not think of them as superficial, and we may 
think of our identity as constituted partly by them.’78 When unpacked these remarks 
imply that each of ‘us’ possesses two social ‘identities,’ as members or citizens of 
two different moral communities, one of which is the cosmopolis which comprises all 
human beings, and the other of which is our own society or community. They also 
imply that each of ‘us’ has two quite different sets of moral or legal duties and 
obligations, the one associated with the ‘natural law’ which ought to regulate the 
conduct of all human beings in their interactions with one another, and the other 
associated with the customs, conventions and traditions of our own community, and 
with the particular ‘place’ or ‘station’ that we have within it. Most importantly, 
though, they indicate that for Nussbaum those features of the self which Cicero 
describes as being ‘particular,’ as opposed to ‘universal,’ are nonetheless a 
necessary component element or part of the self, or of who an individual moral 
agent is. Note that she states that these are not ‘superficial’ and that we might 
rightly think of our identity as being at least partly constituted by them. 
 On the other hand, though, until very recently Nussbaum has defended what 
might be referred to as an ‘extreme’ version of ‘cosmopolitanism’ which she 
suggests is closely related to that of Cicero and the Stoics. According to this version 
of cosmopolitanism the basic ‘units’ of cosmopolitan thinking are indeed abstract 
moral ‘persons.’ Either these ‘persons’ lack completely any determinate social 
identity or, alternatively, although they do possess such an identity this is 
‘irrelevant’ so far as any assessment of their duties as moral agents are 
concerned.79 In short, Nussbaum has in the past attributed to the Stoics generally 
what I have referred to as the ‘Contingency Theory of the Self.’80  
 Nussbaum acknowledges, however, that there are difficulties involved in 
attributing such a view to Cicero, at least if we take into account some of the 
remarks which Cicero makes about personal identity in the passages from his De 
Officiis discussed above – remarks which I have associated with what I have called 
the ‘Necessity Theory of the Self.’ Nussbaum concedes that although in Book III of 
the De Officiis Cicero ‘comes close to asserting that our obligation to humanity takes 
priority over all other obligations, he is far less confident in Book I, and indeed 
makes many more concessions to local affiliation than other Stoic thinkers.’81 Unlike 
A. A. Long, then, Nussbaum considers those remarks which Cicero makes about 
personal identity which are associated with what I have called the ‘Necessity Theory 
of the Self’ to be an aberration, untypical of Stoicism in general, especially Roman 
Stoicism. 
 The ‘Contingency Theory of the Self’ is the one which is usually associated with 
Stoicism, with cosmopolitanism,82 and with Cicero, just as it is also associated with 
the philosophies of Plato, Descartes and Kant. For those familiar with the philosophy 
of these thinkers it is therefore, as Nussbaum has noted, the fact that Cicero 
occasionally says things which appear to support the view that he subscribes to the 
‘Necessity Theory’ which is surprising. This raises the question of whether the views 
expressed by Cicero in Book I of his De Officiis which support the claim that he does 
endorse the ‘Necessity Theory’ can be taken as representative of Stoic thinking in 
general, or of the later thinking associated with Roman Stoicism, or even of Cicero’s 
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own considered position regarding the nature of the self. In connection with the first 
two of these issues, it should be noted that the dramaturgical theory of society and 
its metaphor of society as a theatre, which as we have seen are employed by 
Cicero, are also to be found in the writings of Epictetus.83 Similarly, even in the case 
of Epictetus there is an acknowledgement that the ‘ethical life’ of most human 
beings is closely associated, not so much with the rationally apprehensible and 
universally valid duties and obligations which they have simply because they are 
human beings or moral ‘persons,’ but also with the local and more parochial duties 
and obligations which they have as members of particular political communities. 
Moreover, again in the case of Epictetus, just as in that of Cicero, these local duties 
and obligations are connected to issues relating to personal identity – the question 
of who one is, or who one wants and chooses to be.84 A case could perhaps be 
made, therefore, for the view that the views expressed by Cicero in this text are not 
as untypical of later Stoicism as Nussbaum suggests. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What I hope the analysis of the views of Aristotle and of Cicero presented above has 
shown is that the distance between them is not so great as it is often assumed to 
be. Aristotle is by no means a straightforward advocate of a simple-minded form of 
‘communitarianism,’ whose political thought is entirely devoid of any emphasis on  
universalism, rationalism, and the other things which are usually associated with an 
one-sided understanding of ‘cosmopolitanism’ - especially the notion of an abstract 
moral or legal ‘person.’ Similarly, Cicero is by no means a straightforward advocate 
of a simple-minded form of ‘cosmopolitanism,’ whose political thought is entirely 
devoid of any emphasis on customs and conventions, or on that which is historical, 
local and particular, and the other things which are usually associated with a one-
sided understanding of and commitment ‘communitarianism’ - especially the notion 
that individual moral agents are not abstract ‘persons,’ but possess, and must 
necessarily possess, some determinate social identity or other. I have argued that 
there is evidence to support the view that both Aristotle and Cicero think of 
individual moral agents as complex or composite entities which possess both 
‘universal’ and ‘particular’ characteristics. Neither of them, therefore, is exclusively 
either a communitarian or a cosmopolitan thinker, as these terms are often 
understood. This is not to say that it is entirely inappropriate to characterize them 
as being ‘cosmopolitan’ theorists of some kind, provided one’s understanding of 
what it is to be a cosmopolitan thinker has been suitably qualified. 
 Simon Caney has said, in my view sensibly, that it is an ‘error’ to assume that 
‘to posit a common human nature,’ as perhaps all cosmopolitan thinkers do, is 
necessarily ‘to deny the historicity of persons.’ According to Caney, such a view is 
‘misconceived,’ for to affirm a conception of human nature is to affirm some 
properties that persons have in common.’ It is not, therefore, necessarily to ‘deny 
the many ways in which persons’ membership of cultures render them different.’85 
If the view which Caney appears to endorse here might be thought of as a weak or 
moderate form of cosmopolitanism, then in my view both Aristotle and Cicero could 
be said to be ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers in just this sense. The crucial question for all 
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cosmopolitan thinkers, however, is not so much whether the ‘persons’ who lie at the 
heart of cosmopolitan political thought possess a particular self, or a particular 
social identity which is an historical product, as well a ‘universal’ self insofar as they 
are all human beings, but how important this is for our understanding of them as 
moral agents – of who they are and where their duties lie. As Martha Nussbaum has 
noted, the issue is whether this historical identity is also merely a contingent one 
and therefore ‘morally irrelevant’ so far as cosmopolitan political thought is 
concerned.86 I have argued, against Nussbaum, that for Aristotle and Cicero this is 
not the case, despite the fact that both of them could legitimately be said to be 
‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers in some sense of that term. 
 
 
Appendix: Martha Nussbaum on the Self 
 
Martha Nussbaum has suggested that ‘national origin is rather like class 
background, parental wealth, race, and sex: namely, a contingent fact about a 
person that should not be permitted to deform a person’s life.’87 This suggests that 
an individual would be the same ‘person’ even if (per impossibile) they were 
somehow detached from all of these allegedly contingent characteristic features 
which they merely happen to possess and be associated with other, quite different 
ones. In other words, Nussbaum subscribes to what in the main body of this paper I 
have called ‘the Contingency Theory of the Self.’ But this view might be criticized 
from the standpoint of the ‘Necessity Theory.’ It is true that the person in question 
would continue to be a ‘person’ or a ‘human being,’ considered abstractly, even if 
they were to ‘lose’ all of these characteristic features. But it is arguable that there is 
an sense in which they could not be said to be the ‘same’ person or human being at 
all. From this point of view, the relationship in which individuals stand to the society 
in which they were born and reared, and to its culture and its traditions, is not by 
any means a contingent one. The psychological characteristics associated with being 
a member of that society or state, as opposed to a different one, are just as much a 
part of who one is as those generic characteristics which can be found in all human 
beings. One cannot, therefore, detach oneself from one’s own particular identity 
(what might be characterized as one’s primary social and political identity) in the 
way that Nussbaum appears to be suggesting; or at least one cannot do so without 
some fundamental change of personality, or restructuring,  or reinventing or 
remaking of oneself. Such a process is not by any means as simple as Nussbaum 
appears to think. 
 This point has been well made by Gertrude Himmelfarb, who says that ‘what 
[extreme] cosmopolitanism obscures, even denies, are the givens of life: parents, 
ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, history, culture, tradition, community – 
and nationality. These are not “accidental” attributes of the individual. They are 
essential attributes. We do not come into the world as free-floating, autonomous 
individuals. We come into it complete with all the particular, defining characteristics 
that go into a fully formed human being, a being with an identity. Identity is neither 
an accident nor a matter of choice. It is given, not willed. We may, in the course of 
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our lives, reject or alter one or another of these givens, perhaps for good reason. 
But we do so at some cost to the self.’88
 A similar view has also been maintained by Samuel Scheffler, who also 
subscribes to a ‘Necessity Theory of the Self.’ Scheffler’s views might be taken as a 
direct commentary on the views expressed by Cicero in his De Officiis, and are 
worth quoting at length: 
‘Our most significant social roles and relations…help determine what might be 
called our social identities. To the extent that we choose our roles and 
relations, and decide how much significance they have in our lives, we shape 
our own identities. But to the extent that these things are fixed independently 
of our choices, our identities are beyond our control…The ability to have our 
social identities influenced by our choices is something about which most of us 
care deeply, and which seems to us an important prerequisite for the forms of 
human flourishing to which we aspire. We regard societies in which one’s 
social identity is rigidly fixed as a matter of law or social practice, by features 
of one’s birth or breeding over which one has no control, as societies that are 
inhospitable to human freedom….[204]…And yet…it is clear that the capacity 
to determine one’s identity has its limits. Each of us is born into a web of 
social relations, and our social world lays claim to us long  before we can 
attain reflective distance from it or begin making choices about our place in it. 
We acquire personal relations and social affiliations of a formative kind before 
we are able to conceive of them as such or contemplate altering them. Thus 
there is no question…of our being able actually to choose all of the relations in 
which we stand to other people…For better or worse, the influence on our 
personal histories of unchosen social relations – to parents and siblings, 
families and communities, nations and peoples – is not something that we 
determine by ourselves. Whether we like to or not such relations help to 
define the contours of our lives, and influence the ways that we are seen both 
by ourselves and by others. Even those who sever or repudiate such ties – 
insofar as it is possible to do so – can never escape their influence or deprive 
them of all significance, for to have repudiated a personal tie is not the same 
as never having had it, and one does not nullify social bonds by rejecting 
them. One is, in other words, forever the person who has rejected or 
repudiated those bonds; one cannot make oneself into a person who lacked 
them from the outset. Thus while some people travel enormous social 
distances in their lives, and while the possibility of so doing is something that 
we have every reason to cherish, the idea that the significance of our personal 
ties and social affiliations is wholly dependent on our wills – that we are the 
supreme gatekeepers of our own identities – can only be regarded as a 
fantasy.’89
 
Needless to say, these remarks of Scheffler’s, like those of Himmelfarb, constitute 
an effective criticism only of what I have called a strong or extreme version of 
cosmopolitanism. As a critique of the more moderate form of cosmopolitanism 
which I have associated with both Aristotle and Cicero (at least on one reading of 
Cicero’s thought) they are much less effective. 
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